INTRODUCTION
Brandi Wallace expected her flight from Seoul, South Korea, to Los Angeles, California, to be routine. After consuming a meal, having a drink, and reading her book, Wallace fell asleep in her window seat. 1 According to the standard procedure for long flights, the lights in the cabin were dimmed to help passengers adjust to time changes and ensure their comfort. 2 Some time later, Wallace awoke to find that Kwang-Yong Park, the passenger seated beside her, had undone her belt while she was asleep, unzipped her pants, and put his hand inside her underwear to fondle her private parts. 3 Wallace reported the incident to a Korean Airlines crewmember, and the crewmember assigned Wallace a new seat immediately. 4 Park was arrested upon arrival in Los Angeles. 5 This sexual assault is an example of a copassenger tort, 6 when one passenger on a flight injures another passenger or causes another passenger to be injured. The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air ("the Montreal Convention" or "the Convention") is an international treaty that governs the existence and amount of an air carrier's liability for passenger injuries sustained on international flights, including those resulting from copassenger torts. 7 The Convention premises injuries for which the airline can be liable on whether that injury was caused by an "accident" within the meaning of the treaty. 8 Yet "accident" is not explicitly defined in the document, and this ambiguity forces U.S. courts to apply a heavily fact-based inquiry as to whether certain occurrences are "accidents" under the Convention. This creates a body of U.S. law regarding international air carrier liability that leaves both plaintiffs and airlines uncertain as to what claims will succeed in court. 9 Prior to the incident described above, Park did not act suspiciously, the crew did not notice any unusual behavior, and Wallace did not alert or complain to the attendants about Park. 10 Korean Air could not have prevented the sexual assault, because it could not possibly have foreseen its occurrence. Even so, and even though Wallace herself conceded that the assault was not caused "by a lack of due care on the part of" Korean Air, 11 the Second Circuit found the airline liable for Wallace's assault. 12 9. As one scholar put it, contemplating the meaning of an article 17 accident has become "a metaphysical exercise roughly equivalent to contemplating the number of angels that may dance on the head of a pin." Louise Cobbs, The Shifting Meaning of ' particularized and inconsistent precedent, the Second Circuit found that Wallace's sexual assault was an "accident" as defined by the Montreal Convention. 13 In analogous cases, however, courts have not found premises owners liable where the same conduct occurred in a bus, bar, boat, or other on-ground premises. 14 This challenges one's traditional sense of justice, as it contradicts American jurisprudence's embodiment of the ethical assumption that one should be liable only for injuries one has caused or has a duty to prevent. 15 In conjunction with this tenet is that one has a duty only to prevent harms one can reasonably foresee. 16 The Second Circuit's decision circumvented these foundational principles of American tort law by neglecting to use them in its inquiry of the sufficiency of the causal connection of the assault to the operation of the aircraft.
This Note argues that, although the accident threshold in the Montreal Convention for air carrier liability was included to be an exception to tort law principles, 17 tort principles still are necessary to interpret the accident requirement. Accidents must be causally connected to the operation of the aircraft, 18 and the sufficiency of this causal connection must be interpreted in light of American tort principles to fulfill the intent of the Montreal Convention's drafters and to align Montreal Convention decisions with American jurisprudence's inherent sense of justice regarding who should be liable for negligence and injuries.
[hereinafter WARSAW MINUTES] (noting British representative to the Warsaw Convention Sir Alfred Dennis's statement that "it is therefore not just to impose absolute liability upon the carrier").
13 625, 632 (1959) , in which the Court held "the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes . . . the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances." The Second Circuit had reaffirmed this precedent specifically regarding passengers on ships. See Monteleone v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 838 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1988); Rainey v. Pacquet Cruises, Inc., 709 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1983) . Under the particular circumstances in Jaffess-a sexual assault on a cruise ship's passenger-the court found that "[i]f anything, sexual assault seems less likely to occur on ships than on land" because assailants on land have the opportunity to "flee the vicinity, while persons on ships cannot." Jaffess, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3481, at *11. Therefore, the court found the premises owner had exercised "reasonable care" and refused to hold it liable for the sexual assault. [l] ife will have to be made over, and human nature transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as . . . the customary standard to which behavior must conform").
17. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 13 ("[T]he Warsaw Convention was meant to distinguish between traditional tort injuries and aircraft-related injuries.").
18. See infra Part III.A.
Part I of this Note examines the history of the Montreal Convention and focuses on the reasons for its implementation. It explains how the Warsaw Convention was passed in 1929 to protect the young airline industry from liability levels that could threaten its viability. 19 Ultimately, these goals went unmet as numerous amendments stripped the Convention of its uniformity and easy applicability. To fix this confusion, the signatories to the Warsaw Convention met in 1999 and created the Montreal Convention, which superseded the original convention and sought to fix these issues.
Part II then explains current American jurisprudence under the Montreal Convention and courts' reasoning in labeling certain happenings as "accidents." Part II also considers the current state of copassenger torts under American precedent. 20 Part III reexamines the Convention's legislative history and the operative U.S. cases interpreting the word "accident" to prove that a causal connection to the aircraft is necessary for an incident to be an "accident." Part III also advocates for the use of American tort principles to analyze the validity of an alleged accident's causal connection to the aircraft's operation. Using tort principles to decide whether the causal connection is sufficient to render airlines liable facilitates the intent of the creators of the Convention, the purpose of U.S. tort law, and the foundational sense of morality that underpins the American legal system. Finally, Part III attempts to draw the line at what kinds of copassenger torts are accidents by focusing on what connections these torts must have to the aircraft's operation and the sufficiency of these connections under traditional tort law.
I. A HISTORY OF AIR CARRIER LIABILITY FOR INJURIES ON INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS
Commercial air travel is how our increasingly globalized society shares persons and resources. In less than one hundred years, air travel has gone from nonexistence to transporting 3.5 billion people in 2015. 21 That is almost half of the world's population. 22 Commercial air travel is integral to the world's economy: consumers spend 1 percent of world GDP on air transport, and airlines and their customers generate around $116 billion in 
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[Vol. 85 tax revenue for governments around the globe. 23 Despite this, the commercial airline industry is economically fragile 24 and needs insulation from crippling financial loss through certain limitations on liability. 25 One such protective device is the Montreal Convention, an international treaty governing the liability of air carriers for injuries that occur onboard aircrafts. 26 The Montreal Convention's predecessor, the Warsaw Convention, 27 prioritized protecting the then-nascent airline industry. 28 Understanding the creators' objectives and concerns are essential to properly interpret Montreal Convention "accidents." 29 Accordingly, Part I traces the history of the Montreal Convention, its structure, and its main goals of unifying liability standards and limiting liability for air carriers. Part I.A reviews the intentions of the Warsaw Convention's creators and the purposes for its creation. Part I.B examines the Montreal Convention, the purposes for rewriting international air carrier liability standards, and what-if anything-changed between the two Conventions. (1967) ("The second goal-clearly recognized to be the more important one-was to limit the potential liability of the carrier in case of accidents.").
29. These concerns still exist today, almost one hundred years after the Warsaw Convention originally attempted to address them.
A. The Warsaw Convention: Objectives and Liabilities
Thirty nations met in Warsaw, Poland, on October 4, 1929, to create uniform international air carrier liability standards. 30 As one scholar put it, for the first time, an industry was going to "link many lands with different languages, customs, and legal systems," so lawmakers desired "at the outset, a certain degree of uniformity." 31 A uniform system would make it easier for all parties involved in civil airline litigation-claimants, carriers, and governments-to know their rights and responsibilities and the origins of those rights and obligations. 32 A second paramount objective of the conference was to foster industry growth by limiting international air carrier liability for personal injury, death, and property damage. 33 In the late 1920s, commercial air travel was still an emerging industry. 34 Limited liability would ensure the young industry's development, create predictable guidelines for airlines to secure insurance, and stabilize the industry's operating costs. 35 [T] he Convention sought to limit the potential liability of the air carrier so as to aid in the development of international air transportation, to provide a definite basis for insurance rates for airlines, and thereby to reduce operating expenses with subsequent savings to the airline industry and its passengers.").
which, before the conference, attempted to require passengers to contractually accept a reduced or nonexistent level of carrier liability as a condition of air travel 36 -were worried about compensating accident victims who could threaten to bankrupt their business. 37 The resulting treaty, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, known as "the Warsaw Convention," became law in 1933. 38 It governed "the international carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo by air, and regulat[ed] the liability of international air carriers in over 120 nations." 39 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention addressed international air carrier liability for personal injury or death. It stated:
The carrier [is] liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 40 An airline's liability was premised upon an accident causing the claimant's injury. 41 Read alone, article 17 confers strict liability upon airlines when an accident happens. However, as one scholar notes, "Article 17 is written in a way that clearly indicates that the clauses and parts of the article are to be read as an inter-connecting part to a larger more intricate whole." 42 Therefore, this strict liability must be read in line with the Warsaw Convention's other liability qualifying articles.
Article 17 created a presumption of liability on the air carriers unless they could prove they had taken all "necessary measures to avoid the damage, whereby article 20 allowed them to avoid liability entirely. 44 When an article 17 accident was found to have occurred, article 22 created a monetary recovery limit of $8,300. 45 The carrier also could limit damages with a contributory negligence defense, embodied in article 21. 46 The only time a claimant could recover more than the Warsaw Convention's monetary limit was upon a showing of "willful misconduct" on the part of the carrier. 47 Essentially, the Warsaw Convention drew a fault-based line on personal injury liability: if the airline negligently caused the accident, the claimant could recover only up to the monetary limit; if the airline willfully caused the accident, the claimant had unlimited recovery. However, the Warsaw Convention did not make the airline liable for accidents wholly outside the carrier's control; 48 as stated at the Warsaw gathering, "[The objective is] just not to impose absolute liability upon the carrier but to relieve him of all liability when he has taken reasonable and normal measures to avoid damage: This is the diligence which one can demand of the reasonable man." 49 After the Warsaw Convention's implementation, many signatories found the $8,300 liability limit too low to justly compensate accident victims. 50 Air safety improvements made it easier for carriers to obtain low-cost insurance (lessening their need for legislative protections), lawsuits for accidents on airlines were consistently asking for damages exceeding the Warsaw limit, and a political and academic contention that international air carriers were no longer entitled to special protection began gaining attention. 51 The 1955 Hague Protocol, attempting to address these issues, doubled the monetary limit on recoverable damages for article 17 accidents. 52 
B. The Montreal Convention: Broadening Carrier Liability Standards and Shifting Their Bases
The Warsaw Convention and its supplemental amendments became convoluted and far from uniform. 54 In order to unify the previous forty years' piecemeal amendments, representatives from 118 countries and eleven international organizations met in Montreal in May 1999. 55 The International Civil Aviation Organization's then-president stated at the opening of the Montreal conference:
[The Warsaw Convention's] complexity has been further extended by adding additional rules . . . . The result of these uncoordinated efforts is an increasingly opaque legal framework whose usefulness . . . has become a matter of growing concern, and it is the shared desire of the parties involved that legal certainty and uniformity be restored, while implementing, in a globally-coordinated fashion, the long overdue modernization and consolidation of the [Warsaw] system. 56 This testimony echoes the Montreal Convention's creators' prioritization of uniform and easy to follow international air liability standards.
A second goal of the Montreal Convention's creators was to reflect the amending provisions in their expansion of air carrier liability. 57 The Montreal Convention's article 17 addressed air carrier liabilities for personal death or injuries on flights, just as it did in the Warsaw ) (noting that the Montreal Convention "represents a significant shift away from a treaty that primarily favored airlines to one that continues to protect airlines from crippling liability, but shows increased concern for the rights of passengers" by broadening carrier liability).
Convention. 58 The Warsaw Convention's presumption of air carrier liability remained in Montreal's article 17, but the damages cap was significantly increased (from $8,300 to 100,000 "Special Drawing Rights" (SDRs), an international reserve asset the International Monetary Fund created, equivalent to approximately $135,000). 59 It also stripped air carriers of any defense in actions under 100,000 SDRs. 60 The carrier could escape claims over 100,000 SDRs only if it could prove that factors other than its negligence, like a third party's act, caused the damages. 61 Whereas the Warsaw Convention had divided its two tiers of recovery based on fault, the Montreal Convention did so monetarily. 62 Significantly, for the first time in aviation law, plaintiffs could recover unlimited damages for negligence claims. 63 The Department of Transportation's under secretary for policy found this elimination of "all artificial monetary limits on recoveries from the airline for proven damages with respect to the death or injury of a passenger during an international airline mishap" a cornerstone of the new treaty, and he made sure to point it out when urging the Senate to include the United States as a Montreal Convention signatory. 64 Yet, despite its newly aligned purposes and liability parameters, there were no substantive changes in the liability-inducing provision of the Montreal Convention (still article 17). 65 Because of the lack of substantive 58. See Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 17 ("The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."). Although there were slight changes in language-the Montreal Convention's "in case of death or bodily injury" replaced the Warsaw Convention's "in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury"-no substantive liability changes were made. In the Montreal Convention, international air carrier liability continued to be premised upon an accident occurring, and "accident" continued to be undefined in the treaty. 67 Due to this remaining definitional uncertainty, U.S. courts defining the term "accident" have had to interpret the Convention's plain language and legislative history, creating inconsistent and heavily fact-based precedent.
II. HOW THE UNITED STATES INTERPRETS "ACCIDENT":
AIR 70. Since the two conventions' "accident" articles are essentially the same, see supra note 58, the court's interpretation can be used for both liability limiting treaties, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71. Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
situations-in particular, whether certain copassenger torts-are "accidents" under the Montreal Convention. The resulting confusion and the inconsistent rulings it creates undermine the U.S. legal system's pride in predictability, 72 making it difficult for airlines to predict the outcome of particular cases to adequately insure themselves. Further, it makes injured consumers unsure as to whether they will be able to recover damages. In addition, the Saks definition leaves air carriers virtually unprotected from liability, a result in stark contrast with the entire Montreal Convention's intent. 73 Finally, Part II.C looks at the current state of copassenger torts under this uncertain interpretation regime.
A. Saks and the "Unusual or Unexpected" Measure
After a flight from Paris to Los Angeles, Valerie Saks brought suit against Air France, alleging the plane's depressurization during the flight caused her hearing loss. 74 Saks's claim rested on asserting the plane's depressurization was a Warsaw Convention article 17 accident. 75 Air France moved for summary judgment on the basis that the pressurization system's normal operation was not an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention. 76 While Saks urged the Court to define an article 17 accident as a "hazard of air travel," the airline contended an article 17 accident should be defined as "an unusual or unexpected occurrence." 77 The Supreme Court began by examining the article's plain language. 78 The Court acknowledged, "the word 'accident' is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning" and therefore turned to its context within the Warsaw Convention. 79 The Court noted that, whether written in French or English, the Warsaw Convention imposed article 17 liability for personal injuries on "accidents" whereas article 18 (defining the scope of air carrier liability for damage to cargo) imposed liability for damage to any checked baggage or goods for "occurrences." 80 This differentiation in language indicated that the drafters understood accidents to be different than occurrences. 81 The drafters must have considered some factor present in accidents and not present in occurrences significant enough to induce liability for injury to persons rather than to baggage. 82 The Court identified this differentiating factor as the unusual or unexpected nature of accidents, as opposed to the typicality of occurrences. 83 In support of this finding, the Court looked to the Warsaw Convention's legislative history, noting that "[t]he records of the negotiation of the Convention accordingly support what is evident from its text: A passenger's injury must be caused by an accident, and an accident must mean something different than an 'occurrence' on the plane." 84 The Court enumerated U.S. cases that, although employing a broad definition of "accident," still refused to consider routine travel procedures that produced injuries as "accidents." 85 Finally, the Court considered sister signatories' and U.S. courts' interpretations of article 17 since the Warsaw Convention's ratification. 86 For example, the Court discussed a French legal opinion that held article 17 accidents embrace "causes of injuries that are fortuitous or unpredictable." 87 Ultimately, the Court agreed with Air France that an accident is "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger" and noted, "This definition should be flexibly applied after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries." 88 The Court emphasized that it is the Court's duty to "enforce the . . . treaties of the United States, whatever they might be, and . . . the Warsaw Convention remains the supreme law of the land." 89 Although the Supreme Court defined "accident," the definition requires more clarification, as inconsistent "accident" interpretations continue in lower courts. 
B. Post-Saks Areas of Controversy Regarding Article 17 Accidents
Saks's unusual or unexpected measure does not work as a complete indication of whether incidents are article 17 accidents. Alone, the Saks inquiry is perspective based, focusing on the parties' state of mind, which is not a clear, consistent, or even fair way to assess the air carrier's fault. 90 For example, in Gotz v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 91 a passenger was injured when placing a heavy bag in an overhead bin because another passenger stood up, causing the plaintiff to move and hyperextend his arm. 92 In this case, the man standing up was unexpected from the perspective of the passenger, but from the airline's perspective, it was a normal and routine occurrence in airline operation. 93 In addition, there was no possible way in which the airline could have prevented a man from standing up when he was allowed to move around the cabin. 94 Implicating the carrier in this circumstance extends the carrier's liability far past what the Warsaw Convention's drafters intended. 95 Because of the uncertainty in Saks's perspective-based inquiry, forums have since considered a number of criteria in addition to the unusualness or unexpectedness of an incident to determine what is and what is not an accident. Some of these factors include (1) whether the incident was related to the normal aircraft or airline operations; (2) if the crew members were knowledgeable or complicit in the events surrounding the alleged accident; (3) fellow passengers' acts; (4) the acts of third parties who are not crew or passengers (e.g., terrorists or hijackers); (5) the incident's location; (6) the complainant's role, reaction, or condition in connection with the occurrence at issue; and (7) the risks inherent in air travel. 96 The two most frequently considered factors are whether the incident must be a "risk inherent in air 90 . See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 12 ("The answer to such a question is whatever courts desire it to be. Further, judges are more likely to view these cases through the eyes of a consumer."); see also Cobbs, supra note 9, at 123 (finding that after Saks, "the trend appears to be towards an even fuzzier definition more or less dependent on perspective").
91 travel" 97 and if the incident was causally related to the operation of the aircraft. 98 Because Saks only addressed the "narrow issue [of] whether the respondent can meet [the article 17] burden by showing that her injury was caused by the normal operation of the aircraft's pressurization system," 99 judges are uncertain about which factors are relevant in the "accident" definition. 100 For example, the Eastern District of New York held that a woman falling off of her shuttle bus to pick up her luggage in a separate area of the airport was an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. 101 The court rejected the notion that an article 17 accident must be a "risk inherent in air travel" (which falling off of a bus certainly is not; in fact, it is more a risk inherent in ground travel) because that kind of inquiry would "necessarily involve courts in the 'complicated, always fact laden, and irrelevant question of what constitutes a risk characteristic of air travel.'" 102 However, the Southern District of New York held that a man being accused of smoking marijuana in an airplane restroom was not an "accident" solely because the situation was not an inherent air travel risk, noting, "[o]n the theory that hijackings and terrorist attacks are risks 28, 1990 ) (finding that a passenger tripping and injuring herself on a staircase while on her way to board the plane was an article 17 accident, and stating that the definition of "accident" is "in no way limited to those injuries resulting from dangers exclusive to aviation").
99 103 Whether the "risk inherent in air travel" 104 and "causal connection to aircraft operation" factors are considered essential creates two versions of the "accident" definition: a narrow one, in which accidents must be (1) unusual or unexpected, (2) external to the passenger, (3) causally connected to an aircraft's operation, and (4) a risk in inherent in air travel, 105 and a broader one, where an accident is (1) unexpected or unusual and (2) external to the passenger, regardless of causal relation to the plane's operation or of the occurrence being an inherent air travel risk. 106 The broader definition, adopted by courts like the Ninth Circuit, essentially imposes strict liability on international air carriers for injuries on planes or while embarking or disembarking onto planes. 107 Even courts using the narrower scopes of article 17 accidents stretch the scope of liability to a degree harmful to international air carriers and beyond the capacity to which the drafters of these conventions wanted to subject airlines. 108 This is especially true regarding copassenger torts, where fact patterns are intricate and the airline's involvement in the injury or its prevention requires more investigation than solely whether the tort was unusual or unexpected.
C. The Current State of Copassenger Torts Under Article 17
Courts currently acknowledge that not all copassenger torts are article 17 accidents, although some scholars insist they should be. 109 104. Whether an article 17 accident must be a "risk inherent in air travel" is outside the scope of this Note. The focus of this Note is on tort principles being used to interpret the causal connection requirement. Yet, tort principles also should be used for the risk inherent requirement in the sense that whether a risk is inherent in air travel is causally connected to the air travel and that causal connection should be read in light of tort law. However, the Saks Court seemingly rejected arguments that "accidents" "refer[] to any of the possible hazards of air travel." Pastor, supra note 32, at 583; see also include all copassenger torts. 110 For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that the "premise that an accident under the Warsaw Convention includes, as a matter of law, an assault committed upon a seated Plaintiff by a fellow airline passenger is inaccurate." 111 However, courts using the broad "accident" definition, finding it irrelevant whether an accident is a risk inherent in air travel or causally related to the plane's operation, implicitly allow for air carrier liability in all copassenger torts. 112 Under this broad definition, any injury that occurs on an airplane implicates carriers solely because it occurred during air travel. 113 For instance, the Northern District of California held Singapore Airlines liable for a passenger's foot injury caused by another passenger stepping on his foot. 114 The carrier was held liable even though it could not possibly have prevented the incident, because it occurred before takeoff when passengers were allowed to walk around the plane. 115 Some courts, while adhering to a narrower "accident" definition, do so in a way that makes air carriers liable for basically all copassenger torts. 116 Interpreting the narrowing requirement without considering American tort law causation principles essentially swallows the narrowing factor itself. 117 This liability extent is far beyond the Saks definition or what the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions' makers intended, considering they created the conventions to limit airline liability. 118 In addition, these far-reaching decisions contradict a fundamental tort liability principle-that people should be responsible only for injuries they should have and could have prevented. 119 Part 
III. ARTICLE 17 ACCIDENTS REINTERPRETED
An analysis of the Saks holding and a closer reading of the Montreal and Warsaw Conventions indicate that in order to be an article 17 accident, there must be a clear causal connection between the injury and the operation of the aircraft. This conflates the two most frequently considered narrowing factors (causal connection to aircraft operation and inherent air travel risks) because, to be a risk inherent in air travel, such a risk must logically have a causal connection to the travel. 121 To hold these narrowing requirements as unnecessary "would be effectively to construe the Convention as a statute imposing absolute liability for any harmful occurrence on an international flight," and, as one district court noted, "there is neither a reason nor authority for such a construction." 122 In addition, reexamining these sources indicates that, although the conventions were created as a deviation from tort liability, it is appropriate and in line with precedent to use these tort principles in interpreting the conventions. 123 Part III.A reexamines the Saks decision and the conventions' legislative histories to demonstrate that a causal connection to aircraft operation is necessary for an incident to be an article 17 accident. Then, it discusses why the causal limit on air carrier liability is good policy. Part III.B analyzes the Saks decision, its progeny, and the conventions' legislative history to highlight the creators' intent to analyze causation in light of tort precedent. Finally, Part III.C delineates what kinds of copassenger torts should be considered "accidents" under the Montreal Convention.
A. No Indemnification Without Causation: The Necessity for an Accident to Be Causally Connected to the Aircraft
The Saks decision unequivocally rejects the idea that the conventions impose absolute liability on international air carriers for passengers' injuries. 124 Instead, the Court found that the accident must be unusual or unexpected to make the carrier liable. 125 Part III.A.1 demonstrates that, albeit not explicitly, the Saks decision requires a happening to be causally connected to aircraft operation. Part III.A.2 explains that the conventions' legislative histories echo that requirement. Finally, Part III.A.3 advocates for this causal necessity in light of policy considerations and the current state of the airline industry.
Saks's Context and Treatment of Intention Point to the Necessity for Causal Connections
Saks must be understood within its limited context to be correctly interpreted. 126 The Court's restrictive rather than expansive definition of "accident" is, as the First Circuit put it, "entirely understandable as Article 17 provides for strict liability [for accidents], and there are sound policy reasons to confine that liability to the letter of the text, narrowly construed." 127 Saks never addressed whether an article 17 accident must be causally connected to the aircraft operation because it was never at issue; causation was "assumed or implicit in the decision" because the fact pattern was solely concerned with ear damage resulting from cabin depressurization-an injury clearly resulting from the operation of an aircraft. 128 By deciding Saks based on the context before it, the Court did not intend to "expand 'accident' beyond the intent of the drafters, eliminate the need for there to be a connection between the injury producing event and an aspect of aviation or air craft operation, or render all passenger upon passenger torts actionable." 129 In addition, the Saks Court explicitly decided against adding "unintended" or "unintentional" to the accident definition. 130 This contrasts with the article 17 accident definitions adopted by some sister signatories to the conventions, like France, which require an incident be unintended to be an "accident." 131 It also contrasts with the normal English language accident definition, which is defined referring to intent; for example, Webster's defines "accident" as a "happening that is not . . . intended." 132 The element of intention, if included, should focus on the carrier's perspective. 133 Instead, the Saks Court chose to focus on a certain occurrence's expectedness based on a reasonable passenger's perspective and therefore did not assess the carrier's fault. This is seemingly contrary to the whole point of assigning liability-to make the person at fault pay for damages. 134 Leaving intention out of the accident inquiry does not fit within the Warsaw Convention because the line between limited and unlimited liability was explicitly drawn at willfulness. 135 However, the Court continued to refine this fault analysis by noting that an article 17 accident does not occur if the injury results from a passenger's internal reaction to the "normal operation of the plane." 136 This exception to the Saks definition's language demonstrates that the Court viewed the fault element as causally connected to the plane's operation. 137 The International Court of Justice's (ICJ) interpretation provides additional guidance. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that ICJ interpretations deserve "respectful consideration" by U.S. courts. 138 The ICJ interpretation scheme, a model many courts around the world emulate, 139 gives more priority (than the Supreme Court's interpretation) to two principles: the principle of the natural meaning and the principle of integration. 140 The principle of the natural meaning provides that words and phrases are interpreted in their normal context, and the principle of integration advocates for interpreting treaties with continual reference to their purposes. 141 As the entire Montreal Convention concerns air travel, it follows that all the articles and their words (such as "accident") be interpreted within the airplane's context. Using this framework, a causal connection to the aircraft is necessary. This causal connection can be anything from an equipment malfunction to the actions of the airline employees; yet if an injury results from activity that has nothing whatsoever to do with the plane's operation, it should not be classified an "accident" and expose carriers to liability. 142 This causal necessity is echoed in the Warsaw Convention's and Montreal Convention's legislative histories.
The Conventions' Legislative Histories Support a Mandated Causal Connection
Treaty interpretation endeavors to give meaning to the drafters' intentions. 143 As such, courts "may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties" to more precisely understand the treaty's purposes. 144 Because article 17 lacks substantive change from the Warsaw to the Montreal Convention, it is appropriate to look at both conferences' legislative histories to gauge the intended air carrier liability limits. 145 These legislative histories indicate that the treaty creators presupposed an incident's causal connection with the aircraft in qualifying it as an article 17 accident and did not advocate for a strict liability standard. The Warsaw Convention's drafters were presented with two options for personal injury liability language: a preliminary plan for their consideration created by a team of experts, the Comité International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aériens (CITEJA), 146 and a draft developed at a previous conference, the Paris Protocol. 147 Ultimately, the drafters chose the CITEJA proposal's "narrower language" for liability, a choice from which the Supreme Court found it "reasonable to infer that the Conference adopted the narrower language [of the CITEJA proposal] to limit the types of recoverable injuries." 148 Finally, the writings of Dieter Goedhuis, the Warsaw Convention's official reporter, insisted the drafters' clear intention was that air carriers be freed from strict liability for passenger injuries, writing that "the carrier does not guarantee safety; he is only obliged to take all the measures which a good carrier would take for the safety of his passengers." 149 Goedhuis necessitated causal connection to the aircraft even in the specific case of copassenger torts: "In [a case] . . . in which a passenger is injured in a fight with another passenger, it would be unjustifiable to declare the carrier liable by virtue of Article 17, because the accident which caused the damage had no relation with the operation of the aircraft." 150 A second look at the Warsaw Convention's legislative history and the Saks interpretation of that history and language indicate that causal connections are necessary between an incident and injury to qualify as an article 17 accident.
Necessitating an Accident's Causal Connection
Is Good Policy
Airlines need protection, and mandating a causal connection with the aircraft to classify injuries as article 17 accidents is an incredibly protective measure. Commercial air carriage is a fragile industry 151 in need of governmental safeguards for multiple reasons:
small airlines need protections to grow in a competitive market dominated by large international airlines and large airlines need financial safeguards to continue providing services because of the insecure status of the airline industry.
Unfortunately, today's Montreal Convention scheme does not provide this protection. As one author put it, " [T] he combination between the Montreal Convention's expansion of liability and the precedents developed under Article 17 has the potential to harm the viability of commercial air travel." 152 Requiring a causal connection limits air carrier liability to certain situations 153 instead of inundating them with responsibility for any injury that occurs on a plane. Courts arguing otherwise "fail[] to take account of the fact that the same risk occurs in every other walk of life" and 148. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 543 (1991) ; accord Sokol, supra note 41, at 249 (noting that the Warsaw Convention's article 24(2) limiting language, which reviews damage limits, refers only to cases where an "accident" causes an injury, and therefore "logically implies that there are cases not covered by Article 17").
149 153. These situations end up being ones in which the airline is in the best position to mitigate risks, in line with American tort jurisprudence. See infra Part III.C. unreasonably extend air carrier liability past notions of premises liability for torts occurring on land. 154 The Montreal Convention applies to small airlines as well as large international ones. 155 Many assume the Convention only applies to large international air carriers, but in fact, the Convention applies to any carrier on a passenger's itinerary if the itinerary includes at least two stopping points in different sovereigns' territories. 156 This means the Montreal Convention can cover any airline, even a domestic one. 157 For example, a passenger goes from London to New York, then changes planes and goes on a different airline's flight from New York to Washington. The Montreal Convention would apply if that passenger were injured on the second, purely domestic flight, even if that airline had never sent a plane outside U.S. borders. 158 Notably, "the Montreal Convention has a broader reach than a first glance would reveal." 159 Small domestic airlines need protection to compete in the oligarchic commercial air travel industry. 160 In addition, even bigger airlines-who some assume "are in a position to distribute among all passengers what would otherwise be a crushing burden upon those few unfortunate enough to become 'accident' victims" 161 -need protection due to the commercial air industry's fragile economic state and "weak profitability." 162 Even though today's international air travel contributes significantly to the world economy, there is a "mismatch between the value that the industry contributes to economies and the rewards that it generates" for investors and the airlines themselves. 163 164 Also, the United States's continued signatory status to the Montreal Convention echoes the legislature's insistence that airlines are persistently in need of liability protection. It is not for the judicial but rather the legislative and executive branches to evaluate whether air carriers should be strictly liable for injuries that occur on planes or whether air carriers are in a state to do so. 165 The concerns of the Warsaw Convention's creators are still just as paramount today, one hundred years after the creation of air travel, as they were at the dawn of the industry. For example, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, which capped liability claims against airlines that arose from the attacks. 166 Although a domestic action, the legislation limiting liability was enacted to prevent the airline industry's collapse. 167 As one scholar put it, "These [more recent] measures demonstrate that the limits on recovery for claims against the airlines are not relics of the past." 168 Because causal connections between incidents and injuries are necessary in article 17 accident inquiries, courts must uniformly interpret these connections' sufficiency. They can do so while remaining consistent with the intent of the conventions' creators by using tort law notions of negligence, proximate causation, and foreseeability.
B. General Tort Principles Are Necessary to Analyze Causal Connections
The causal connections between injuries and aircraft operation should be analyzed with general tort principles. Part III.B.1 illustrates how the conventions, their legislative history, and their subsequent interpretation do not exclude using tort law. In fact, the sources seem to advocate using it. Part III.B.2 then applies tort principles to a particular Supreme Court case, Olympic Airways v. Husain 
Tort Law Is Not Precluded from Accident Analysis
Simply because the Montreal Convention is an exception to tort principles does not mean courts cannot use these principles to interpret the extent of this exception. Although the accident requirement is a departure from the foundational tort principle of full compensation for injury victims because it limits a claimant's ability to recover if the injury does not fit within the requirement (therefore leaving some people without a valid claim under the Convention), 170 this does not preclude tort law's use to figure out what constitutes an "accident."
Doing so is consistent with the conventions' creators' intentions, subsequent U.S. cases interpreting Saks, and domestic flight liability standards.
In fact, the Warsaw Convention "based its approach toward air carrier liability on the fault theory of tort." 171 Its creators uniformly spoke of rendering air carriers responsible only for injuries they could have reasonably prevented. 172 For instance, the original Warsaw Convention provided as a valid defense that air carriers took all necessary measures to avoid the damage. 173 Courts hold the "all necessary measures" defense should be interpreted as "all reasonable measures," 174 based on the reasonableness idea embodied in tort law. This is in line with tort negligence principles implicating only those who have committed a wrong or have failed to protect people for whom they are responsible from injury sources relatively under their control. 175 It is also consistent with American airline liability legislation outside the Montreal Convention, which states, "A carrier of passengers by airplane is not an insurer of the passengers' safety, and its liability for injury to or the death of a passenger must be based upon some negligence or fault for which the carrier is responsible." 176 Additionally, to bolster their holdings' validity, U.S. courts point out their decisions' consistency with American tort jurisprudence. 177 One can view Saks's "unusual or unexpected" measure as embracing tort law's integral accident inquiry role because it brings in an element of foreseeability. 178 Courts also have explicitly held that whether claimants are "entitled to assert the Warsaw Convention [causes of action]" and what their respective rights are should "be determined by reference to other federal statutes"-the majority of which are based on foundational tort jurisprudence. 179 In fact, the Second Circuit has explicitly "adopt[ed] the federal common law of torts to construe the [Montreal] Convention." 180 As such, liability limitations in tort law-including ideas of contributory negligence, reasonableness, and foreseeability-should apply to whether incidents are considered within the definition of an article 17 accident. The Saks holding, the legislative histories of the conventions, and subsequent interpretation of the conventions all support a requirement that an "accident" be (1) an unusual or unexpected happening, (2) external to the passenger, (3) causally connected to the operation of an aircraft, and (4) consistent with common law tort jurisprudence evaluating the causal connection. This definition, albeit abstract, removes some of the subjective fact-based inquiry and ambiguity as to what is and is not a Montreal Convention article 17 accident throughout U.S. courts. This is illustrated in the Supreme Court decision Olympic Airways v. Husain, 181 described further below.
Applying Tort Principles to Article 17 Analyses: A Reexamination of Olympic Airways v. Husain
In Husain, the Supreme Court held Olympic Airways liable for a passenger's death from smoke exposure after a flight attendant refused to move him away from the smoking section. 182 The Court, petitioner, and respondent all focused on the flight attendant's refusal to move the passenger's seat and viewed the relevant question of law as whether a failure to act could constitute an "accident." 183 Both parties denounced using a negligence inquiry into whether the incident was an article 17 accident and instead focused on the Saks unusual or unexpected measure. 184 This ignores the Saks's implication that a causal connection to aircraft operation is necessary and that using tort law to interpret that causal requirement was not only permitted but also advocated by Saks, its progeny, and the conventions' legislative histories. 185 Husain did not hold that omission could be considered an action in general, because the airline attendant's refusal to move the decedent can be seen as an affirmative action, not an omission. 186 However, the majority's dicta noted that "the failure of an airline crew to take certain necessary vital steps could quite naturally and, in routine usage of the language, be an 'event or happening.'" 187 In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia focused on the dangers of considering omissions as "accidents" for article 17 analyses 188 : it made carriers liable for anything that may occur on the plane whether or not the air carrier could have prevented it, which is far past what legislators originally intended and which could potentially "transform the airline into an insurer for any harmful event." 189 The focus in Husain should have been whether the causal connection to the aircraft operation-the flight attendant's refusal to move the decedentwas, within American tort jurisprudence, a legitimate proximate cause of the passenger's injury. If found a sufficient causal connection, the refusal would be an article 17 accident and make the carrier responsible for injuries resulting from that refusal; if not, Olympic Airways would not be liable for the passenger's death.
An accident analysis anchored in tort law would still find Olympic Airways liable while simultaneously solving the issue with which Scalia was so concerned-putting strict liability on airlines. 190 In common law torts, a common carrier (like the owner of an airplane, a cruise ship, or a bus) is liable for injuries that are foreseeable and within the carrier's ability to prevent. 191 In Husain, the decedent asked multiple times to be moved away from the smoking section and explained to the stewardess why he was particularly sensitive to smoke. 192 His injury was clearly foreseeable, and therefore the air carrier's refusal to move him-the causal connection with his injury to the aircraft-was negligent and a legitimate proximate cause within tort jurisprudence. 193 Because the airline attendant's refusal to move him was (1) an unexpected and unusual occurrence, (2) external to the passenger, 194 (3) causally connected to the passenger's injury, and (4) the causal connection was sufficient according to common law tort jurisprudence, it falls within the "accident" definition of article 17.
Using tort law to analyze Montreal Convention accident causal connections is a consistent and equitable strategy to impose liability on air carriers in line with the Convention's creators' intent. It is a strategy that avoids sweeping fact-based holdings that further complicate accident cases and go against the American sense of integrity. 195 
C. What Copassenger Torts Are Article 17 Accidents?
Understanding that a causal connection with aircraft operation is necessary for incidents to be Montreal Convention accidents and that the causal connection must be in line with tort jurisprudence simplifies analyzing whether airlines should be responsible for a copassenger tort. In addition to this simplification, it allows copassenger tort cases a measure of predictability important to carriers, claimants, and governments. This understanding also will keep copassenger tort decisions in line with the original Montreal Convention goal of protecting air carriers, while also incentivizing airlines to maintain diligent observation and security measures. 196 In tort jurisprudence, premises owners do not have a duty to protect people from others unless the owners see foreseeable indicators that another patron or a third party will inflict harm on one of its patrons; only then does a duty to act develop. 197 Indicators of foreseeability include previous incidents by that patron or third party on the property. 198 When an airplane is the tort's premises, there is a minimal chance that a particular group of flight attendants will encounter a passenger they have previously seen commit a copassenger tort. However, there remains a foreseeability requirement to implicate an airline for injuries sustained by passengers.
For example, a fistfight between two sober passengers has nothing to do with aircraft operation, was not foreseeable, "nor may carriers easily guard against such a risk through the employment of protective security measures"; therefore air carriers should not be responsible for resulting injuries. 199 This is in line with tort law common carrier liabilities and the duty to protect others from the conduct of third parties: without an incident's foreseeability, there is no duty. 200 However, when an airline's attendant negligently violates the carrier's policy by overserving alcoholic beverages to a passenger who then injures another passenger, the injury is causally connected enough to the aircraft to render the carrier responsible (because it is foreseeable that getting a passenger drunk will result in misbehavior). 201 Canonizing this "accident" definition would relieve airlines of liability for sexual assaults that occur on planes when alcohol was not served to the perpetrator and when there was no other foreseeability indicator for the assault. In these situations, the air carrier is not involved in the chain of causation: a sexual assault is not causally related to the operation of an aircraft. 202 Courts would not have to use the shaky logic of Wallace v. Korean Air, 203 which attributes usual and expected aspects of flights (e.g., close quarters, having lights off) to inherent air travel risks and therefore implicates the air carrier. 204 The Wallace Court did not find the carrier liable for the sexual assault (which could be seen as "internal" to the pair of passengers) but rather for the "characteristics of air travel [that] increased [Wallace's] vulnerability to assault." 205 If courts were to continue using the Wallace logic, it would force airlines to, in order to escape liability, keep the lights illuminated on long flights and require passengers to stay awake-both conditions that would likely increase air rage and create more copassenger torts-bad for airlines, passengers, safety, and policy. 206 
CONCLUSION
Protecting airlines, and the legislative histories corroborating this goal, should not be shunted aside in favor of a broader interpretation of the conventions forcing air carriers to compensate victims for any injury occurring on a plane. Airlines should not be strictly liable for injuries that occur onboard: nothing in the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions' histories nor in the tort jurisprudence surrounding them indicates otherwise. The subsequent interpretation of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, both created to protect airlines, has distorted the accident requirement to hold air carriers responsible beyond the limits to which they would be held accountable by tort jurisprudence.
In order to be an article 17 accident, an incident must be (1) unusual or unexpected, (2) external to the passenger, (3) causally connected to the operation of the aircraft, and (4) the causal connection must be sufficient under a traditional tort law evaluation. Using this definition makes sure that courts are ruling in a manner consistent with Saks, the conventions' legislative histories, and notions of responsibility and morality. This definition is especially helpful in analyzing copassenger torts, where the causal connections are intricate and where American tort jurisprudence has a rich history of assigning liability to the premises owner or other actors. Ultimately, this narrower definition of article 17 accidents gives courts, airlines, and claimants their deserved predictability, protection, and justice.
